A Legal Anomaly or a Strategic Loophole? The (Un)Contested Terrain of Religious Denomination in the Places of Worship Act

*Mansi Awasthi

Introduction

The Supreme Court delivered M Siddiq (D) Thr Lrs v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors (“the Ayodhya judgement”) in 2019, which made discussions around the Places of Worship Act, 1991 (hereinafter, “Act”) relevant, and has only made the clamour for temple reclamations louder. The Act prohibits conversion of the religious character of place of worship from as it existed on 15th August, 1947, by barring the institution of any suit concerning such conversion. Along with the surge in efforts to reclaim religious sites, the Act has also been challenged in the Supreme Court on the grounds that it violates the fundamental rights to equality and freedom of religion. This necessitates a more nuanced discussion around the Act. Until now, discussions surrounding the Act have primarily focused on whether the Act bars the determination of the religious character of a place of worship. This article will examine the anomaly resulting from the Act’s usage of the term “Religious Denomination” in Section 3, a potentially exploitable loophole to argue the non-applicability of the Act in future proceedings relating to temple reclamations. the author believes that such an argument will not stand the test of legislative intent, thereby defeating the purpose of the act.

The Places of Worship Act: The Ambiguity of “Religious Denomination” 

The Act was enacted during the religious turmoil arising post the Ram Janmabhoomi Movement- all the while carving it out as an exception to the Act. However, the Act is inconsistent in its scheme of terminology. A plain reading of Section 3 of the Act suggests that it bars the interdenominational conversion of religious places. Section 4 of the Act, however, provides for the protection of the religious character (and not denominational character) of a place of worship as it existed on 15th August, 1947. Again, the definition of Place of Worship in the definition clause of the Act uses the phrase “… place of public religious worship of any religious denomination” [emphasis added].  

Therefore, there is an apparent anomaly between these sections, as one of them refers to “religious denomination” while the other refers to “religious character”. This gives rise to 4 questions:

1. What is the meaning of “religious denomination” in law? Can it, in any circumstance, be used interchangeably with religion? 

2. What was the intent of this legislation while using the term “religious denomination”? 

3. If there was indeed a specific intent of the legislators in using “religious denomination”, why did the Preamble and Section 4 employ the usage of “religious character” and not “religious denominational character”?

4. Could this discrepancy serve as a basis for arguing the non-applicability of the Act in proceedings relating to Shahi Idgah Mosque, Gynavapi Complex and other such temple reclamations in future? 
   

This piece intends to primarily answer the fourth question on the basis of conclusions to the first three questions. The attempt is to delve into the judicial interpretation of “Religious Denomination” and the legislative intent and assess if the observed discrepancies could undermine the applicability of the Act. 

Judicial Interpretation of Religious Denomination 

Though the Constitution of India confers certain rights under Part III, to Religious Denominations, it doesn’t define the word Religious Denomination. The Supreme Court had dealt with the question as to what may constitute a religious denomination for the first time in The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowment Madras v. Shri Laxmindar Tirtha Swamiyar of Shirur Mutt. Here, the Court considered the dictionary meaning of the term and laid down the following:

(1) Religion means “a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well- being” and need not be theistic.

(2) "Religious denomination" means a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name.

This was followed in cases like The Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali and further in the SP Mittal v. Union of India. In the SP Mittal case, the Court laid down three conditions to be satisfied for a sect to qualify as a religious denomination:

1. “It must be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith;

2. common organisation; and 

3. designation by a distinctive name.”
   

In Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala too, the court upheld the same propositions while deciding on the question as to whether Lord Ayyappa’s devotees constitute a religious denomination and if they have denominational rights. Moreover, Justice Chandrachud, in his concurring opinion, added another requirement to the ones already quoted:

1. “A common thread of religion.”
   

The jurisprudence surrounding the meaning of the term Religious Denomination makes it abundantly clear that the term cannot synonymously be used with religion. While it may be understood as a subset of a religion, it is clearly not a religion. A set of individuals being a religious denomination means that they are entitled to certain denominational rights conferred under Article 26 of the Constitution which are not necessarily conferred upon members of a religion in general sense. Therefore, to answer the first question, it is evident that Religious Denomination carries a distinct meaning and standing in law and is different from Religion. It carries a narrower meaning and hence can not be used interchangeably with religion.   

Decoding the Legislative Intent

Explicit or implied, deciphering the legislative intent is the first priority of the Courts while interpreting a statute. Therefore, the intent must be culled out from factors like phrasing of statute, the preamble to the Act, and the statement of objects and reasons. Once that is done, the interpretation must be such that it only furthers the intent and does not defeat it. A plain reading of the preamble and the objects and reasons of the Act clearly defines the purpose of the Act, which is to prevent inter-religious conversion of a place of worship. Section 4, again, declares that the religious character of a place of worship shall remain the same as it was on 15th August, 1947, and prohibits the institution of any suit with respect to conversion of the religious character of any place of worship. 

The Act was debated in the parliament for over 8 hours spread out over three days. The then Home Minister, SB Chavan after introducing the bill said, “It is considered necessary to adopt these measures in view of the controversies arising from time to time with regard to conversion of places of worship, which tend to vitiate the communal atmosphere.” The debate took place in the backdrop of a raging Ram Janmabhoomi Movement and had repeated references to it. 

Taking into consideration the preamble of the Act, the parliamentary debates and the circumstances under which it was passed, the intent of the legislature is quite clear, that to prevent inter-religious conversion of religious places. Nowhere is it even remotely suggested that the purpose was confined to prohibiting interdenominational conversion. Moreover, if by any stretch it is assumed that prevention of interdenominational conversion was the intent and the only intent, then the exception carved out in Section 5 of the Act for Ram JanmabhoomiProceedings would be rendered illogical. This particular case too dealt with inter-religious conversion, seeking to reclaim the Masjid Complex for the Ram Temple. Therefore, to address the second question, the intent of the legislation is as stated in the Preamble to the Act. Based on the discussion above, there is no specific decipherable intent behind using Religious Denomination in Section 3, thereby rendering the third question mostly redundant. By using the term ‘religious character’ in Section 4, the legislature aimed to protect the fundamental religious nature and identity of a place of worship. To say it in plain words, the aim was to prevent another Ram Janmabhoomi like movement which not just disturbed the communal harmony but also resulted in law-and-order situations. And hence, the Act put a bar on any suit seeking to alter the ‘religious character’ of a place of worship from as it existed on 15th August, 1947.

As explained in the case of M/s Girdhari Lal v. Balbir Nath Mathur, it is perfectly justified for the court to deviate from the golden rule of interpretation to prevent any anomaly, absurdity or invalidation of law and to give effect to the object of the enactment. Further, the court can correct the mistakes in the drafting of the statute by adding, removing or modifying words to further the actual aim of the legislation. Therefore, the court can resolve this anomaly by interpreting the Act in a way that effectuates its intended purpose, even if it requires deviating from the literal wording of the statute. 

Conclusion 

Given the discussion above, and assuming that the Court adopts a purposive approach of interpretation, arguing the inapplicability of the Act on future temple reclamation proceedings on the ground that the contest is for inter-religious conversion and not to change the denominational character and therefore Section 3 of the Act does not apply, would be a very difficult argument to sustain. Thus, to answer the fourth question, should such an argument arise, the author believes that the courts are likely to prioritize the legislative intent while ensuring that the wording of one Section does not render the entire Act inapplicable on suits seeking conversion of religious places. This would defeat the very purpose of the Act.  

As pointed out previously, Section 3 of the Act, apart from being inconsistent, also narrows the scope of the Act by using the term Religious Denomination. However, the author believes that the judiciary can reconcile it by applying the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction. That is to say that despite the primary objective of the Act to preserve the religious character, the sections of the Act are encompassing enough to prevent an attempt to change the denominational character of a place of worship if at all such a situation arises in future. This approach will ensure that the broader purpose of preserving communal harmony is upheld, thereby avoiding any legal inconsistencies and aligning with the legislative intent.

*Mansi Awasthi is a 2nd year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B, at Hidayatullah National Law University.

The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Pith & Substance: The CCAL Blog.